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Ex Turpi Causa: Reformation not Revolution
Ernest Lim*
(2017) 80 Modern Law Review (forthcoming)
Seldom has an area of law been so afflicted with uncertainties  and contradictions  as  the
illegality defence and rarely have judicial opinions been so sharply divided as in the Supreme
Court decision in Patel v Mirza. There nine Justices examined the issue of what the correct
approach to the illegality defence is. Six of them endorsed the ‘range of factors’ approach
whereas  three  condemned  it.  This  paper  defends  the  majority’s  approach  against  the
minority’s criticisms and argues that refinements have to be made to it in order to ameliorate
the concern of uncertainty that may arise from its application.
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INTRODUCTION
The illegality defence is an important topic because first, it extends to civil claims in almost
all branches of private law with different factual matrixes; and secondly, its application not
only  can  cause  disproportionately  harsh  consequences,  but  has  produced  unacceptable
confusion and uncertainty. A panel of nine Justices was convened in Patel v Mirza1 to resolve
the issue of what the correct approach to the illegality defence is. It seems that the majority
and the minority agreed on only two main points, the first  of which is that the illegality
defence – ‘no court  will  lend its  aid to a man who founds his  action upon an illegal or
immoral act’2 - is a rule of public policy, and the second is that judgment should be given for
the claimant. There are stark differences between them on the question of how the illegality
defence should be interpreted and applied. Lord Toulson delivered the leading judgment (with
which Lady Hale, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson and Lord Hodge agreed). He set out the range of
factors approach (which was endorsed by Lord Neuberger in a separate judgement) which
1* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. I would like to thank the anonymous referee 
for comments. The usual disclaimers apply.
 [2016] 3 WLR 399 (‘Patel’).
2 Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341 at 343 (Lord Mansfield).
1
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requires  the  evaluation  and  balancing  of  considerations  involving  public  policies  and
proportionality.  This  approach  drew sharp  rebuke  from the  minority  (Lord  Mance,  Lord
Clarke and Lord Sumption)  who forcefully rejected it.  Lord Sumption (with whom Lord
Clarke agreed) affirmed the rule-based approach. 
THE LAW PRIOR TO PATEL
Lord Neuberger3 observed that the law was uncertain because of the unsatisfactory reasoning
of  the  majority  in  Tinsley  v  Milligan4 and  it  was  in  disarray  because  of  the  different
approaches to the illegality defence adopted by the Supreme Court in the three cases prior to
Patel, i.e.  Hounga  v Allen5,  Les Laboratoires Servier  v  Apotex Inc6 and  Bilta (UK) Ltd  v
Nazir (No 2)7. 
The  reasoning in  Tinsley was  criticised  by the Law Commission.8 The problem with the
procedural reliance test in Tinsley is that it has no regard for the merits of the parties or the
public policies underlying the illegality defence, and thus it could lead to arbitrary results.9 In
Tinsley, because the defendant contributed to the price of the house which she purchased with
the claimant, the defendant was able to invoke the presumption of resulting trust, although
they vested the house in the claimant’s sole name in order to carry out a social security fraud.
However, if the relationship of the parties had been that of a mother and daughter, and the
house was vested in the latter’s name, there would be a presumption of advancement in her
favour. Thus, the mother’s claim would be barred by the illegality defence as she had to rely
on the illegality to rebut the presumption.10 Further, there is uncertainty and confusion as to
3 Patel, n 1 above at [164].
4 [1994] 1 AC 340 (‘Tinsley’).
5 [2014] 1 WLR 2889 (‘Hounga’).
6 [2015] AC 430 (‘Les Laboratoires’).
7 [2016] AC 1 (‘Bilta’).
8 The Law Commission, The Illegality Defence: A Consultative Report (LCCP 189) (2009). The Law 
Commission, The Illegality Defence (Law Com 320) (2010). See also Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538 at 
595-613.
9 Law Com 320, ibid, at [2.13]-[2.15].
10 See also Collier v Collier [2002] EWCA 1095.
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the meaning and application of ‘reliance’.11 The Commission recommended that in deciding
whether  a  claim should  be  barred  by the  illegality  defence,  regard  should  be  had to  its
underlying policies.12 
On the conflicting approaches adopted in the three Supreme Court decisions, they can be
broadly characterised as the strict versus flexible approach. Under the strict approach, the
illegality  defence  has  to  be  strictly  applied13;  there  is  ‘no  room for  the  exercise  of  any
discretion by the court in favour of one party or the other’14 and ‘is indiscriminate’15 as it is
‘bound to confer capricious benefits on defendants some of whom have little to be said for
them in the way of merits.’16 The majority’s decision in  Les Laboratoires exemplifies the
strict approach. The flexible approach is supported by the majority’s reasoning in  Hounga.
Subsequently, in  Bilta, Lord Toulson and Lord Hodge17 endorsed the flexible approach, but
Lord Sumption18 rejected it  and adopted the strict approach. Under the flexible approach,
courts have to evaluate and balance competing public policies; ‘it is necessary, first, to ask:
“What is the aspect of public policy which founds the defence?” and, second, to ask “But is
there  another  aspect  of  public  policy  to  which  application  of  the  defence  would  run
counter?”’19 These three decisions have been extensively analysed,20 with opinions largely
divided between those who support the strict approach and those who endorse the flexible
approach.
11 Law Com 320, n 9 above.
12 The key ones are whether allowing the claim would undermine the purpose of the rule that prohibited the 
conduct, the connection between the illegality and the claim, the gravity of the parties’ conduct, and 
proportionality of denying the claim: LCCP 189, n 8 above at [3.142].
13 Bilta, n 7 above at [62] (Lord Sumption).
14 Tinsley, n 4 above at 355 (Lord Goff dissenting), endorsed in Les Laboratoires, n 6 above at [16] (Lord 
Sumption).
15 Tinsley, n 4 above at 364D-E (Lord Goff dissenting), endorsed in Les Laboratoires, n 6 above at [16] (Lord 
Sumption).
16 Les Laboratoires, n 6 above at [13] (Lord Sumption).
17 Bilta, n 7 above at [171]-[174].
18 Ibid at [62], [99]-[102].
19 Hounga, n 5 above at [42] (Lord Wilson).
20 JC Fisher, ‘The ex turpi causa principle in Hounga and Servier’ (2015) 78 MLR 854; E Lim, ‘Attribution and
the Illegality Defence’ (2016) 79 MLR 476; N Strauss, ‘Ex Turpi Causa Oritur Actio?’ (2016) 132 LQR 236 at 
248-256; E Lim, ‘Tensions in Private Law Judicial Decision-Making’ [2016] JBL 325; A Burrows, Restatement 
of the English Law of Contract (OUP, 2016) at 221-230.
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The arguments in favour of the flexible approach are that it is not inconsistent with, let alone
precluded by,  Tinsley;  after  all,  Tinsley did not address the issue of whether the illegality
defence  should  still  apply if  doing so  will  not  only fail  to  give  effect  to  its  underlying
policies, but will be contrary to another rule of law; the flexible approach forms the basis of
the ratio in Hounga, a binding authority; the flexible approach gives effect to the policies and
rationales underlying the illegality defence; the strict approach will not necessarily lead to
greater certainty and predictability than the flexible approach because of the problems with
the reliance rule in  Tinsley; and the strict approach can lead to injustice. The arguments in
favour  of  the  strict  approach  are  that  the  flexible  approach is  contrary to  Tinsley which
precludes any weighing of policies; the flexible approach will not only result in uncertainty of
the law, but it  may run the risk of judicial  legislation; and it is unclear what exactly the
policies are and how they should be weighed and thus there might be errors when judges
perform the balancing exercise.
Thus, because the law had been uncertain and in disarray, Lord Neuberger said that it was
necessary to have an enlarged panel of the Supreme Court address the question of the correct
approach to the illegality defence ‘as soon as appropriately possible.’21 This opportunity came
up in Patel.
FACTS AND DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The claimant, Mr Patel, paid £620,000 to Mr Mirza to place bets on RBS’s share prices using
advance insider information, which contravened section 52 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993.
But the insider information never became available and the betting did not take place. Patel
sued Mirza for the return of the money.  Mirza said that  his  claim was precluded by the
illegality  defence.  The  specific  issue  was  whether  Patel  was  entitled  to  restitution  of
£620,000. The broader and more important issue was how the illegality defence should be
understood  and  applied  not  only  in  this  case  but  other  cases  whether  or  not  involving
contractual illegality. 
The High Court rejected Patel’s claim as he had to rely on his own illegality to establish the
claim  and  the  exception  of  locus  poenitentiae  did  not  apply  as  he  had  not  voluntarily
21 Bilta, n 7 above at [15].
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withdrawn from the illegality.22 The Court of Appeal23 unanimously allowed Patel’s appeal
but differed on the reasoning. The majority (Rimer and Vos LJJ) said that Patel was entitled
to  repayment  as  the  contract  remained  wholly  unexecuted  and  thus,  whether  Patel  had
voluntarily withdrawn did not matter.24 But assuming it did, the majority agreed with the trial
judge  that  his  claim would  be  barred  as  he  had  relied  on  the  illegal  transaction  in  his
pleadings.25 Gloster LJ however said that what he pleaded was irrelevant as the illegality did
not necessarily form part of his case.26 More importantly, she examined the policy of the rule
that was infringed and the public policies underlying the illegality defence, none of which she
concluded barred the return of the money to Patel.27 Mirza appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Correct Approach to the Illegality Defence – ‘Range of Factors’
Lord Toulson’s ‘range of factors’ approach (with which five justices agreed) can be summed
up in a series of propositions:28
1. The policy rationale of the illegality defence is to protect the integrity of the legal
system (‘Proposition 1’).
2. In  order  to  know  whether  allowing  a  claim  that  is  tainted  by  illegality  would
undermine the integrity of the legal system, regard must be had to:
a. the underlying purpose of the law that has been infringed, such as that of the
statutory provision that has been breached (‘Proposition 2(a)’);
b. any other relevant public policies which may be negated or undermined by
denying the claim, such as those underlying another law that is applicable to
the facts of the case (‘Proposition 2(b)’); and
22 [2014] LLR 110 at [43] and [49].
23 [2015] 2 WLR 405.
24 Ibid at [45] and [116] and [118].
25 Ibid at [20] and [102].
26 Ibid at [78]-[93].
27 Ibid at [65]-[76].
28 Patel, n 1 above at [101], [107] and [120].
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c. the proportionality or otherwise of denying the claim, the relevant factors of
which include how serious the conduct was, how central the conduct to the
claim  was,  whether  it  was  intentional,  and  whether  there  was  a  material
disparity in the parties’ respective wrongdoing (‘Proposition 2(c)’).
Lord Toulson approved the conclusion and reasoning of Gloster LJ which was identical to the
range of factors approach in all material aspects.29 First, Gloster LJ said that the purpose of
section 52 is to prohibit insider dealing, i.e. the deliberate exploitation of insider information
which may distort a regulated market. But it is not contrary to the policy or purpose of the
law to order the defendant to return the money which the claimant paid to him for the purpose
of  making  profit  by  misusing  insider  information  which  eventually  did  not  materialise
(Proposition 2(a)). Second, she said that to deny relief to the claimant would be contrary to
another  provision  of  the  same  statute  which  states  that  no  contract  shall  be  void  or
unenforceable  merely because  of  s  52  (Proposition  2(b)).  Finally,  she  said,  among  other
reasons, that there was no causal connection between the illegal conduct (the agreement to
engage insider dealing transaction) and the claim to have the money repaid, the claimant was
not  found  to  have  known  that  taking  advantage  of  inside  information  was  illegal,  and
claimant was not trying to recover a benefit from his own wrongdoing (Proposition 2(c)).
Thus, the illegality defence should not apply. The court ordered the defendant to return the
money to the claimant.
Lord  Neuberger  who  also  endorsed  the  range  of  factors  approach  arrived  at  the  same
conclusion but by a different route. Instead of setting out the correct approach to the illegality
defence (like Lord Toulson), he set forth the rule that a claimant is entitled to the return of his
money which  he  paid  to  the  defendant  pursuant  to  an  illegal  transaction  which  was  not
proceeded with.30 He said that this rule is consistent with authorities and policy and renders
the law more certain.31
The Minority’s ‘Rule-Based’ Approach
29 Ibid at [115], [15]; n 4 above at 425-8.
30 Patel, n 1 above at [146].
31 Ibid.
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The minority’s  ‘rule-based approach’,  stated by Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Clarke
agreed), can be summed up as follows:32
1. The illegality defence precludes courts from enforcing the legal rights of the claimant
which are derived from or founded on the illegal act committed by him. 
2. The policy rationale of the illegality defence is  to avoid inconsistency in the law.
There is  inconsistency when a claimant  is  punished by the criminal  court  for  his
illegal act but a civil court allows recovery by the claimant by giving effect to his
legal rights that are founded on the illegal act.
3. “Founded on the illegal act” refers to whether the claimant has to rely on the illegality
in order to support his claim, which is known as the reliance test.
4. Exceptions:  Because the illegality defence is  applicable only when the parties are
equally at fault in relation to the illegal act, there are two categories in which the law
treats them as not being equally legally culpable:
a. the claimant’s participation in the illegal act is treated as involuntary such as
when it was procured by fraud, undue influence or duress on the defendant’s
part; and 
b. where there is inconsistency with the law which renders the act illegal, the
prime (but by no means sole) example of which is that the law is intended to
protect persons such as the claimant from exploitation by persons such as the
defendant.
Lord Sumption said that although the claimant had to and did rely on the illegal transaction in
order to establish that there was no legal basis for the payment, he was entitled to relief as
ordering the money that he paid to the defendant to be returned to him did not give effect to
the illegality or a right derived it.33 This is because restitution merely restored the parties to
their original position as if they had not entered into the illegal transaction.34 Likewise, Lord
32 Ibid at [233]-[234], [241]-[244].
33 Ibid at [268].
34 Ibid.
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Mance said that relying on illegality in order to enforce an illegal contract or to gain a benefit
from the illegal act is prohibited by the illegality defence.35 But reliance for the purpose of
restoring the parties to the status quo ante is permissible.36 Thus, the minority’s key reason for
holding in  favour  of  the claimant  is  that  restitution  was available.  Lord  Mance said this
restitutionary  concept  underlies  the  doctrine  of  locus  poenitentiae.37 But  he  and  Lord
Sumption disapproved of its moral undertones and its subsequent, unduly narrow scope.38
Lord Sumption said that the right to restitution should not depend on the moral quality of the
claimant’s withdrawal;39 to him, the law is that ‘restitution is available for so long as mutual
restitution of benefits remains possible.’40 
CRITIQUE
Range of Factors Approach: Criticisms
The two main  criticisms  levelled by the  minority against  the  majority’s  range of  factors
approach are  that  it  is  ‘entirely novel’41 or  ‘revolutionary’42,  and  the  exercise  of  judicial
discretion  involved  in  the  weighing  and  balancing  of  different  factors  would  result  in
unacceptable uncertainty. 
Revolutionary?
35 Ibid at [199].
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid at [202]. Lord Toulson at [116] however saw no need to discuss the question of locus poenitentiae as he 
was able to address the questions raised in this appeal using the range of factors approach.
38 Ibid at [197], [202], [248], [252]-[253].
39 Ibid at [252]-[253].
40 Ibid at [253]. His obita statements suggest there is or should be no longer a role for locus poenitentiae (at 
least insofar as the doctrine holds that the claimant’s withdrawal must be voluntary or penitent). 
41 Ibid at [206] (Lord Mance).
42 Ibid at [261] (Lord Sumption).
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The first criticism is misconceived, particularly or at least in relation to Propositions 1 and
2(a) and (b) of the range of factors approach, both of which are well-supported by authorities.
In any event, the range of factors approach does not warrant the castigation from Lord Mance
that it amounted to ‘tearing up the existing law and starting again.’43
On Proposition 1 of the range of factors approach, all of the justices including the minority
cited and endorsed the celebrated judgment of McLachlin J in the Canadian Supreme Court
decision in  Hall v Hebert44 where she held that ‘the basis of this power [i.e to allow the
illegality defence],  as I see it,  lies in duty of courts to preserve the integrity of the legal
system,  and is  exercisable  only where  this  concern is  in  issue.’45 She then said that  this
concern is in issue where allowing the claimant’s claim would permit him to profit from his
illegal act or to evade a penalty prescribed by criminal law. She concluded by reiterating that
the illegality defence is justified to prevent the integrity of the justice system from being
compromised.46 That is the policy rationale of the illegality defence, which was also endorsed
by the Supreme Court in its earlier decisions47.
Lord  Wilson  clarified  in  Hounga  that  there  are  examples  other  than  those  stated  by
McLachlin J in which the concern for the integrity of the legal system would arise.48 Further,
as Lord Toulson pointed out, she qualified her statement that the claimant will not be allowed
to profit from his wrongdoing by saying that the statement not only does not fully explain
why some claims have been rejected, but may have the undesirable effect of tempting judges
to focus on whether the claimant is ‘getting something’ out of the illegal act, rather than the
more important question of whether permitting recovery for something which was illegal
would result in inconsistency and disharmony in the law, and thus jeopardising the integrity
of the legal system.49 
43 Ibid at [208].
44 [1993] 2 SCR 159.
45 Ibid, 169 (emphasis added).
46 Ibid, 178-9.
47 See eg, Hounga, n 5 above at [43]-[44] (Lord Wilson); Les Laboratoires, n 6 at [24] (Lord Sumption).
48 Hounga, ibid at [44].
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Accordingly,  in order to know whether there will be damage to the integrity of the legal
system, one has to know whether there will be inconsistency in the law, and in order to know
that,  one  has  to  examine  whether  allowing  or  denying  the  illegality  defence  will  be
inconsistent with: (a) the terms, purpose or policy of the law which has been infringed; and
(b) the terms, purpose or policy of any other law which applies to the facts of the case. This
mirrors Proposition 2(a) and 2(b) of the range of factors approach. If allowing the illegality
defence would frustrate the purpose or policy of the law which has been infringed and/or
frustrate the purpose or policy of another law, which although not infringed by the claimant,
but which applies to the facts of the case, then there will be inconsistency and hence the
integrity and coherence of the legal system would be undermined. 
Equally importantly, not only do Propositions 2(a) and 2(b) of the range of factors approach
flow from Proposition 1, but they are firmly grounded in authorities, i.e. in at least two recent
Supreme Court and one Court of Appeal decisions.50 Tellingly and crucially, the minority in
Patel v Mirza did not disagree with the reasoning or result in these three decisions.  
In Hounga,51 where Lord Wilson delivered the judgment for the majority,  the evaluation of
public  policies  approach ‘unquestionably forms  part  of  the  ratio  of  the  decision.’52 Lord
Wilson said that to allow the illegality defence might encourage illegal employment and even
discrimination against persons in the position of the claimant with impunity.53 Further,  to
allow the defence would be contrary to the policy against trafficking and in favour of the
protection of the victims which underlie the Convention Against Trafficking Against Human
49 Patel, n 1 above at [100].
50 Admittedly,  there  is  one  decision  that  seems  inconsistent  with  the  range  of  factors  approach  –  Les
Laboratories Servier. But Lord Kerr clarified (at [131] of Patel) that in that decision, the court did not reject the
evaluation of competing public policies.  Although Lord Kerr is correct, it  is apparent that  Lord Sumption’s
approach to the illegality defence is inconsistent with that of Lord Wilson in Hounga, as was recognised by Lord
Sumption himself  (at  [226]).  It  would have been far clearer  and simpler if  the Supreme Court  had simply
declared that insofar as Les Laboratories is inconsistent with the majority’s range of factors approach, it should
not be followed.
51 Hounga, n 5 above at [42].
52 Patel, n 1 at [132] (Lord Kerr).
53 Hounga, n 5 above at [44].
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Beings  to  which  the  UK is  a  party.54 In  short,  allowing  the  illegality  defence  would  be
inconsistent with the purpose or policy of the antidiscrimination statute (Proposition 2(a)) and
the Convention (Proposition 2(b)). 
Lord Wilson’s approach was subsequently applied by Sales LJ (with whom McCombe LJ
agreed) in  R (Best)  v Chief Land Registrar  (‘Best’).55 He held that to allow the illegality
defence would be inconsistent with both the policy underlying section 144 of the Legal Aid,
Sentencing and Punishment  of  Offenders  Act  2012 which was infringed by the  claimant
(Proposition 2(a)), as well as that of the Land Registration Act 2002 which applied to the
facts of the case (Proposition 2(b)). 
In Bilta,56 Lords Toulson and Hodge said that to allow the illegality defence in order to bar the
company from suing its fraudulent director for breach of fiduciary duties would be contrary
to the common law and sections 172(3) and 180(5) of the Companies Act (Proposition 2(a)).
Lord Neuberger agreed with them on this point.57 (Proposition 2(b) was not in issue as there
was no countervailing public policy.) Moreover, as discussed earlier, Gloster LJ’s analysis of
the illegality defence substantially mirrored the range of factors approach.
With  respect  to  Proposition  2(c)  of  the  range  of  factors  approach,  although  it  is  not  as
robustly  grounded  in  authorities  as  Propositions  2(a)  and  2(b),  there  are  dicta  that  lend
support to it which were referred to by Lord Toulson.58 Further, the court in Hounga, Best and
ParkingEye Ltd v Somerﬁeld Stores Ltd (‘ParkingEye’)59 did refer, albeit obiter, to the factors
in Proposition 2(c) (such as seriousness of the illegality, its centrality to the claim, whether it
was intentional, and the level of culpability between the parties). Tellingly, the minority in
Patel v Mirza did not express disapproval of the reliance on those factors in those decisions. 
54 Ibid at [51]-[52].
55 [2015] 3 WLR 1505 at [51]-[61].
56 Bilta, n 7 above at [130]. But note that Lord Sumption decided that case on the basis of attribution and he 
rejected Lord Toulson and Lord Hodge’s policy-based reasoning: Bilta, n 7 above at [86], [99]-[102].
57 Ibid at [20].
58 Patel, n 1 above at [104]-[106].
59 [2013] QB 840
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Nevertheless, Proposition 2(c) is justified not so much by the dicta, but by Proposition 1. As
Lord Toulson pointed out, ensuring that the criminal and civil courts act consistently is one
way  to  protect  the  integrity  of  the  legal  system.  Ensuring  that  the  result  is  not
disproportionate to the nature and seriousness of the wrongdoing is another. Indeed, while
civil courts should not undermine the criminal courts by allowing the claimant to evade the
penalty prescribed by the latter, the former should not impose disproportionate penalty. As he
said, ‘[r]espect for the integrity of the justice system is not enhanced if it appears to produce
results which are arbitrary, unjust or disproportionate.’60 
However, the problem with Proposition 2(c) is that it is vulnerable to the criticism that Lord
Goff in Tinsley made against the public conscience test – courts would be required to ‘weigh,
or balance, the adverse consequences of respectively granting or refusing relief’61 on a case
by case basis  – with which rest  of the Appellate Committee agreed. Lord Goff’s dictum
which was also raised by the minority in Patel was not repudiated by the majority, at least not
expressly so. (What was disavowed was the reliance test in Tinsley.) Further, Proposition 2(c)
is inconsistent with Lord Mansfield CJ’s dictum in Holman v Johnson62 where he said that the
illegality  defence  is  not  supposed  to  achieve  justice  for  the  parties;  what  is  more,  he
recognised  that  the  application  of  the  defence  would  result  in  injustice  to  the  claimant
(‘contrary to the real justice’63). 
Inconsistency with these influential dicta is not the only concern. Another concern is that the
weighing  of  the  consequences  in  deciding  whether  or  not  to  grant  relief  entailed  by
Proposition 2(c) would lead to considerable uncertainty. This brings us to the second criticism
levelled by the minority judges which is partially valid. 
Uncertainty?
Lord Sumption said: ‘An evaluative test dependent on the perceived relevance and relative
weight to be accorded in each individual case to a large number of incommensurate factors
60 Patel, n 1 above at [108].
61 Tinsley, n 4 above at 358.
62 n 2 at 343.
63 Ibid.
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leaves a great deal to a judge’s visceral reaction to particular facts…. No one factor would
ever be decisive as a matter of law, only in some cases on their particular facts.’64 
Lord Toulson gave three rebuttals to the uncertainty criticism: (1) the law as it stood was
already fraught with uncertainties; (2) he was unaware of serious problems caused by the
adoption of the flexible approach in other jurisdictions and (3) certainty is important when
citizens engage in lawful activities but the same consideration does not apply in the same way
to those who contemplate illegal activity.65 
The first rebuttal is persuasive: this is evident in the way the reliance test was applied in
Tinsley  and  subsequent  cases.66 Lords  Toulson  and  Kerr  pointed  out  that  there  has  been
considerable confusion on what reliance meant, what it is that needs to be relied, and the
degree  of  reliance  required.67 Equally or  more  important,  the  test  has  been  applied  in  a
procedural and mechanical sense with no regard for the policy rationales of the illegality
defence; this problem is exemplified in Tinsley and the cases following it.68 Further, the fact
that the judges in the Court of Appeal in  Patel  expressed different views on whether there
was  reliance  on  the  illegality  by  the  claimant  exemplifies  the  difficulties  and  hence
uncertainty caused by the reliance test. Unsurprisingly, Lord Toulson held that the reliance
rule in Tinsley should no longer be followed.69
It might be said however that the range of factors approach has merely replaced the existing
uncertainties with another or different level of uncertainty. Whether the reliance test in the
rule-based approach generates less uncertainty than the range of factors approach (as asserted
by Lord Sumption and implied by Lord Mance) can only be determined empirically. As to
which approach is the lesser of two evils, only time will tell. For now, there is persuasive
empirical evidence (as evinced in the Law Commission’s two consultation papers and final
report70) that the reliance test has generated unacceptable uncertainty, but not so (or at least,
not yet) with regards to the range of factors approach. Further, although it might be said that
64 Patel, n 1 at [263].
65 Ibid at [113].
66 Ibid at [17]-[24].
67 Ibid at [4]-[8]; [134], [138].
68 Ibid at [24].
69 Ibid at [110]. 
70 The Law Commission, Illegal Transactions: The Effect of Illegality on Contracts and Trust Law (1999), 
Consultation Paper No 154 (CP 154); LCCP 189, n 8; Law Com 320, n 8 above.
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reforms ought to be pursued by Parliament and not the courts, Lord Toulson71 noted the Law
Commission’s findings72 that because of the difficulties of statutory reform, judicial reform is
more appropriate.
Lord Toulson’s second rebuttal seems weak. As Lord Mance said, the foreign authorities in
support of the range of factors approach are ‘slender’73 and the court was presented with no
evidence  that  there  have  been  no  problems  with  the  flexible  approach  adopted  in  other
jurisdictions.
Lord Toulson’s third rebuttal does not distinguish the different kinds and extent of illegality
and whether it was intentional when he said that ‘people contemplating unlawful activity’74
should not expect the same level of certainty as that which is accorded to people who engage
in lawful conduct. For example, a claimant who paid money to a defendant to commit theft or
murder cannot expect certainty in the law with regards to the outcome of their conduct or at
least  cannot  be entitled  to  the same level  of  certainty as  those who engage in  reputable
behaviour. But it is different where the purpose of the act is legal but one of the parties may
have unwittingly infringed the law in the course of performance; there, parties are entitled to
certainty in the law. Further, as Lord Neuberger said, innocent third parties are entitled to
certainty as the decision whether to allow the illegal defence would affect them.75
Thus, only the first of Lord Toulson’s three rebuttals to the minority’s objection is persuasive.
While the range of factors approach does not deserve the condemnation that the minority
heaped on it, it is clearly not unproblematic. In light of Proposition 2(c)’s inconsistency with
the dicta in  Tinsley and  Holman and in view of the uncertainty and unpredictability that its
application might cause, it  is suggested that the Supreme Court could consider doing two
things  at  the  next  appropriate  opportunity.  First,  it  could  consider  expressly rejecting  or
71 Patel, n 1 above at [25].
72 These difficulties include but are not limited to the fact that courts still have to “go through the difficult 
process of statutory interpretation in order to establish whether the legislature had impliedly provided that the 
claim is unenforceable”, and the definitions and scope of the proposed legislative discretion are unclear: LCCP 
189, n 8 above at [3.109]-[3.122].
73 Ibid at [207].
74 Ibid at [113].
75 Ibid at [158].
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qualifying the dicta.76 Secondly, the Supreme Court could consider making refinements to the
range of factors approach.
Range of Factors Approach: Refinements
The  range  of  factors  approach,  as  articulated  by  Lord  Toulson,  gives  judges  significant
discretion to accord the weight that they deem fit to each of the three sub-propositions in
Proposition 2 (i.e 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c)). However, it is suggested that the Court could consider
clarifying that Propositions 2(a) and (b) are the controlling factors and Proposition 2(c) is
subordinated  to  Proposition  2(a)  and  (b),  to  which  primacy  has  to  be  accorded.  If  the
application of Propositions 2(a) and (b) can resolve the question of whether the illegality
defence should be allowed, it is not necessary to proceed to apply Proposition 2(c). 
For example, as demonstrated by the reasoning of Lord Wilson in Hounga, Gloster LJ in the
Court of Appeal and the majority in  Best,  the application of Propositions of 2(a) and (b)
would have already resolved the question of whether to allow the illegality defence. It was
unnecessary to proceed to and consider Proposition 2(c) (although the courts in those cases
did so). Further, Lords Toulson and Hodge in  Bilta rejected the application of the illegality
defence solely on the basis of Proposition 2(a). Propositions 2(b) and (c) were not relevant. 
However, if no determinate outcome can be achieved by the application of Propositions 2(a)
and (b), then Proposition 2(c) can be applied but no more than is necessary to give effect to
Proposition 1 (i.e. protect the integrity of the legal system) and to dispose of the case. This
might happen, for example, in three types of cases, the first and second of which concern
statutory provisions and the third common law.
The first is that if allowing the illegality defence will give effect to the purpose of the legal
provision that has been infringed (Proposition 2(a)) but contrary to the purpose or policy of
another applicable legal provision (Proposition 2(b)). In this case, the court would have to
consider Proposition 2(c) and the final decision to allow or reject the illegality defence must
give effect to Proposition 1, which will be the overriding consideration.
76 One reply to the dicta was already given by Sir Robin Jacob (with whom Toulson LJ and Laws LJ agreed) in 
ParkingEye, n 60 above at [39]: ‘Proportionality as I see it is something rather different [from the exercise of 
judicial discretion inherent in the public conscience test]. It involves the assessment of how far refusal of the 
remedy furthers one or more of the specific policies underlying the defence of illegality.’
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The second example is where only Proposition 2(a) but not Proposition 2(b) applies because
there is no other relevant policy underlying a legal provision other than that in Proposition
2(a). Assume that allowing the illegality defence is consistent with the purpose of a statutory
provision  that  has  been  infringed  (Proposition  2(a)).  But  the  claimant’s  illegal  act  was
involuntary (because it was, for example, induced by fraud, duress or undue influence).77 In
this  example,  the  court  would  have  to  consider  Proposition  2(c).  It  ought  to  reject  the
illegality defence.
However, assume the claimant’s conduct was not involuntary and it does not qualify for any
statutory  or  equitable  exceptions  (if  they  exist).  Nor  is  the  claimant  within  the  class  of
persons that is protected by the statute. In this case, if on a proper construction, the statutory
provision requires that relief be denied to the claimant, courts have no choice but to comply
with the statute.78 They should not have any discretion to consider Proposition 2(c) even if it
would be disproportionate to refuse the relief because, for instance, the claimant’s illegal act
was trivial or the claimant was far less culpable than the defendant. As mentioned earlier,
Proposition 2(c) should be subordinated to Propositions 2(a) and (b). To put it differently,
disregarding the terms or purpose of an applicable statutory provision which the claimant has
breached (Proposition 2(a)) by rejecting the illegality defence in order to satisfy a judge’s
perceived sense of disproportionateness or unfairness caused by the denial of the claim would
cause far greater damage to the integrity of the legal system. But where a contract involving
illegal conduct is not void on a proper construction of the statutory provision that has been
infringed  (Proposition  2(a)),  nor  is  it  barred  by  the  policies  of  other  applicable  laws
(Proposition 2(b)),  the illegality defence should be rejected.  It  is unnecessary to consider
Proposition 2(c).
The third example concerns breach of a common law rule that is often generic and widely
applicable.  There is  nothing in  the purpose or  policy of  the  law that  has  been infringed
(Proposition  2(a))  –  for  instance,  the  common  law  rules  regulating  formation  and
performance of contract – that will shed light on the issue of whether to allow or deny the
77 See eg, Burrows v Rhodes [1899] 1 QB 816.
78 See eg, Anderson Ltd v Daniel [1924] 1 KB 138. Devlin J said in St John Shipping Corpn v Joseph Rank Ltd 
[1957] 1 QB 267 that the claim in Anderson failed because the contract was prohibited by the statute. By 
contrast, in St John’s Shipping, Devlin J said that a proper construction of the statute did not bar relief for the 
claimant.
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illegality defence on the specific facts of the case. An example can be found in ParkingEye79.
There the claimant sued for repudiatory breach. The defendant raised the illegality defence on
the basis that the claimant intended to commit deception in the performance of the contract.
As Proposition 2(a) is not determinative, courts have to consider Proposition 2(c) which the
Court of Appeal did in ParkingEye.80 
In  sum,  because  the  application  of  Proposition  2(c)  has  the  potential  to  give  rise  to
considerable  uncertainty  and  even  arbitrariness,  the  benefit  of  the  above  suggested
refinements is to provide greater structure to the range of factors approach by restraining the
court’s exercise of discretion through the specification of the relationship between each of the
three sub-propositions and in particular the circumstances under which Proposition 2(c) can
be considered. 
Rule-Based Approach: Criticisms
According  to  Lord  Sumption’s  rule-based  approach,  the  law  on  illegality  defence  is
characterised as  one that  is  based on a  relatively clear  rule  with limited exceptions.  The
policies underlying the law on illegality defence are its rationales which must not be confused
with  the  rule  itself;  thus  judges  are  required  to  interpret  and apply the  rule  and not  the
policies.81 
The  question  then  is  that  in  light  of  the  uncertainties  and  arbitrariness  surrounding  the
reliance test82 which is the linchpin of the rule-based approach, should courts (i) continue to
strain the application of the rule in order to ensure that there is no grave injustice or serious
error  in each case;  (ii)  create  more exceptions  to  the rule;  or (iii)  replace the rule-based
approach with the range of  factors  approach? The Law Commission considered all  three
approaches but only endorsed the third one.83 The Commission noted that under the first and
second approaches, needlessly and endlessly complex case law has been generated; so have
79 n 60 above.
80 Ibid at [32]-[35], [38]-[40], [53], [61], [68], [69], [71]-[73].
81 Patel, n 1 above at [261].
82 n 8-11, 68-70 above.
83 LCCP 189, n 8 above at [3.53]-[3.55].
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been the technical distinctions, largely because of the confusion surrounding the reliance test.
So, one should either modify or replace the reliance test with something else. But because
Lord  Sumption  would  have  it  neither  way,  the  application  of  his  rule-based approach is
destined to repeat the same problems and even engender new ones. Unsurprisingly, the third
approach was preferred by the Commission because given that the illegality defence is a
judge-made rule that is  specifically based on public policies which may vary in different
situations, the most appropriate and effective way to implement the rule is to identify and
give effect to its underlying policies, instead of mechanically applying the letter of the rule
with no regard for its policy rationales. 
The problem of the approach of having a rule followed by exceptions is also evidenced in
Lord Clarke’s endorsement of Lord Neuberger’s formulation of the rule: a claimant is entitled
to the return of the money that he has paid to the defendant under a contract to carry out an
illegal  act  but  the act  is  not  carried  out  due to  matters  beyond the  parties’ control  (‘the
Rule’).84 Lord Clarke praised the Rule as it is not only consistent with authority and policy,
but ‘renders the outcome in cases of contracts involving illegality and the maxim ex turpi
causa non oritur actio relatively clear and uncertain.’85 He said that the Rule does not require
the balancing of any public policies as ‘it  simply applies the principles derived from the
authorities to the facts of the case.’86 
However, Lord Clarke has overstated the certainty and clarity of the Rule and underestimated
the complexities that may arise which may not be captured by the Rule or its exceptions87. To
put it differently, the Rule is not able to provide a clear and fair answer unless one examines
the public policies underlying the illegality defence.
Take two examples mentioned by Lord Neuberger. First, the Rule, in itself, is not able to
provide clear guidance where, for instance, the purpose and formation of the contract are not
illegal, but while performing the contract, the defendant would have to commit, of which
both parties are well-aware,  an illegal but incidental  and trivial  act  such as parking on a
84 Patel, n 1 above at [146].
85 Ibid at [210].
86 Ibid at [212].
87 Lord Neuberger said at [162] there are two possible exceptions to the Rule: (a) the rule should not be applied 
where the defendant falls within the class of persons that is protected by the statute and (b) the claimant should 
be entitled to no or only partial recovery where the defendant was unaware of the illegality and in particular if 
he had altered his position.
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double red line.88 If  the defendant breaches the contract by refusing to  perform, it  is  not
apparent from the rule (or its exceptions) whether the claimant is entitled to damages. Or if
the claimant has fulfilled the terms of the contract but had to park on a double red line, it is
not manifest from the rule whether the defendant has to pay the claimant. On the former,
Lord  Neuberger  said  that  the  public  policy of  consistency would  require  courts  to  deny
damages to the claimant. On the latter, Lord Neuberger said that the claimant is entitled to be
paid in full for his performance albeit committing the trivial and incidental illegal act. But no
reason was given by him. The only sensible justification requires examination of the public
policies under the range of factors approach: in order to protect the integrity of the legal
system,  whether  allowing  the  claimant’s  claim  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  terms  or
purpose of the law that has been infringed and whether it would be disproportionate to deny
him relief.
Second, the Rule is not able to provide clear and authoritative answer ‘where the nature of the
criminal activity was more serious and/or more central to the activity involved, where the
illegal activity was expressly included in the contract, or where one of the parties did not
know or intend that the activity in question to be carried out was illegal but the other did, or
where  the  proceedings  arose  out  of  the  fact  that  such  a  contract  had  only  been  partly
performed.’89 Further, it is not possible to lay down a clear and definitive rule that would
cover the second example and any other future examples. Thus, although Lord Neuberger
said that the application of the Rule would resolve and dispose of this case, he endorsed Lord
Toulson’s  range  of  factors  approach  because  of  the  considerable  permutations  and
complexities that have arisen and could continue to arise from cases involving contractual
illegality that are not contemplated by the Rule.90
CONCLUSION
The minority’s rule-based approach ‘has failed to deliver on what some have claimed to be its
principal virtue viz ease of application and predictability of outcome.’91 Admittedly, the range
88 Patel, n 1 above at [178].
89 Ibid at [179] (Lord Neuberger).
90 Ibid at [180]-[182].
91 Ibid at [134] (Lord Kerr).
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of factors approach is not strictly necessary for the resolution of the specific issue in this case
and the disposal of the appeal (as demonstrated by Lord Neuberger’s Rule and in particular
Lord Mance and Lord Clarke’s reasoning). However, because the law was in ‘disarray’,92 the
majority was correct to have set the record straight by authoritatively pronouncing on what
the correct approach to the illegality defence is. This approach has been shown to be well-
supported by authorities, and, if refinements suggested in this article are made, is likely to
result in significantly less uncertainty than the minority’s rule-based approach. 
92 Ibid at [164] (Lord Neuberger).
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